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tween foreign ports or otherwise . . . addresses itself to the congress and
not to the courts. 712
RONALD E. OLIVEIRA
Mortgages—Effect of a Nonjudicial Sale Under a Contractual Power
on a Junior Federal Tax Lien.—United States v. Bank of America Trust
Say. Ass'n. 1—The plaintiff was a mortgagee under a deed of trust on
certain corporate realty. Subsequent to the execution of the deed of trust
the federal government liened the land for unpaid taxes. Upon the corpora-
tion's default on the mortgage obligation the property was sold under a
power of sale contained in the deed of trust. Plaintiff, the purchaser, brought
an action to clear the title of the tax lien pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2410
(1958).2
 The action was removed to the United States District Court for
the Southern District of California where judgment was entered for the
plaintiff. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, reversed. Held: a federal tax lien, even though junior to a mortgage,
cannot be extinguished by a nonjudicial foreclosure of the mortgage under
a power of sale, since federal statutes provided specific methods for the
extinguishment of tax liens, 3 and foreclosure under a power of sale is not
among those enumerated. Consequently the court is powerless to clear the
title.
The instant case relies heavily on Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
v. United States, 4
 in which the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that once a federal tax lien attached to property it could not be removed
except by prescribed statutory methods. Only in such manner can the
government be said to have waived its sovereign immunity from suit.
Therefore a judicial determination in a proceeding other than those pre-
scribed would have no effect in determining the status of the government's
lien when an attempt is being made to remove it.
Opposed to this doctrine is the holding of United States v. Boyd,' in
which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that the
government, as a junior lien-holder, does not have to be made a party in
foreclosure proceedings in those situations where state law does not require,
12 267 F.2d 170 at 178.
1
 265 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. granted 361 U.S. 811 (1959).
2 "The United States may be named a party in any civil action or suit . . . in any
state court having jurisdiction of the subject matter to quiet title, or for the foreclosure
of a mortgage or lien upon real or personal property on which the United States has
or claims a mortgage or other lien." 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a) (1958).
3 In addition to 28 U.S.C. § 2410, supra note 1, see also 28 U.S.C. § 7424 (1958)
(providing for a judicial proceeding in which the court will adjudicate the validity of
all claims and where a valid lien of the government is found to exist, the court may at
its discretion decree a resale), and 68A Stat. 781 (1954), as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 6325
(1958) (providing for an administrative hearing to discharge valueless liens).
4
 107 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1939).
3 246 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1957).
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for the extinguishment of a junior lien, that the subordinate lien-holder
be brought into the proceedings. If, under state law, the lien could be
rendered worthless by foreclosure of a lien senior to it, it should not be
necessary for the mortgagee' to secure a judicial determination that the
junior lien had in fact become worthless.
In a more recent cases the question of the waiver of the government's
immunity from suit was again raised. The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, in opposition to the holding in the case under report, decided that
when 28 U.S.C. § 2410 provides that the government "may" be named
a party in litigation,? "may" is used in the permissive sense, and the govern-
ment is required as a party only where state law would require a joinder
of the junior lien-holders.
The point of pivotal significance in these cases would be the interpreta-
tion of the meaning of "rights to property" as used in 26 U.S.C. § 6321
(1958), which creates a lien in favor of the federal government for unpaid
taxes on all "property or rights to property" of the delinquent taxpayer.
While it has been recognized in all the cases in which the problem has
arisen that the state law of the situs will prevail in determining what
constitutes "rights to property," the extent to which the state law has
been taken into account has varied. In the present case and in the
Metropolitan case the application of state law was limited to the determina-
tion as to whether a sufficiently attachable interest was present. As pointed
out in the dissenting opinion in Metropolitan the majority failed to take into
account the precise nature of the interest of the mortgagor. The result is
that while by state law the res to which the federal lien attached, to wit the
interest of the mortgagor in the property, was capable of destruction on
exercise of the power of sale, the lien which attached solely to the mortgagor's
interest was not. There are, however, cases to the contrary holding that
where by state law the mortgagor's interest is extinguished by the foreclosure
of the senior lien the junior liens including a junior tax lien are also
extinguished even though the government, as junior lien-holder, was not
made a party to the foreclosure proceedings?'
It would appear then that the diversity of opinion rests largely on the
fact that the Sixth and Ninth Circuits hold that once an attachable interest
is found and a government lien attaches it cannot be removed except with
the government's consent, this consent being granted only when a proceed-
ing is instituted through one of the statutory methods. The Third and Fifth
Circuits, however, hold that although a valid Iien attached, it attached only
to an interest which could be extinguished upon exercise of the contractual
power of sale. Therefore when the power is exercised the lien likewise is
6 United States v. Brosnan, 264 F.2d 762 (3rd Cir. 1959).
7 See supra note 2.
United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
9 United States v. Brosnan, supra note 6 (recognizing a Pa. judicial sale to which
the government was not made a party); Trust Co. of Texas v. United States, 3 F. Supp.
683 (S.D. Tex. 1933) (holding a federal lien extinguished on exercise of a power of
sale).
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extinguished. Thus there is no need for the government's joinder in the
exercise of this power in order that their lien be removed.
The decision in the principle case may lead to at least two undesirable
consequences. The court's interpretation of the requirements for clearing
title under 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1958) would seem to nullify its basic purpose.
Since the right to bring an action to clear title was a later addition to the
statute, the inference would appear to be that Congress sought to facilitate
title clearance. 10
 However, a holding that a prior judicial determination of
the validity of the federal lien is a prerequisite to bringing an action to clear
title would tend to be directly opposed to this. The opinion was raised in
at least one case that to so require would tend to drive all foreclosures of
land subject to a federal lien into the courts. 11 It would not appear likely
that such a consequence was intended.
A second possible consequence of this holding would be a diminution of
the use of the contractual power of sale and a resulting decrease in its
economic value. The basic purpose of the power of sale is to allow the
mortgagee to dispose of the property by a nonjudicial sale rather than
requiring judicial foreclosure proceedings." However, this advantage is
decreased when a federal lien attaches, since the mortgagee then cannot
exercise the power effectively without first seeking a judicial determination
of the validity of the government's claim. This possibility has been criti-
cized on the ground that it might amount to an impairment of a contract
right by a subsequent act of sovereignty."
EDWARD F. HENNESSEY
Mortgages—Pre-emption of State Law by Federal Statute when Gov-
ernment is a Mortgagee.—John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Het-
ze/. 1
—The United States became a second mortgagee under an F.H.A. loan
on property of which the Plaintiff was first mortgagee. Plaintiff obtained
a foreclosure order at a proceeding in a Kansas District Court at which
the United States was made a party. At the foreclosure sale the plaintiff was
the sole bidder and bid in for an amount equivalent to its interest. The
District Court confirmed the sale and issued an 18 month exclusive redemp-
tion certificate to the mortgagor. The United States then commenced an
action in the same court pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. 2410(c) 2
 to obtain a
10
 See United States v. Bank of America Trust & Say. Ass'n, supra note I, at 869,
footnote 3.
11 United States v. Boyd, supra note 5.
12 1 Glenn, Mortgages 607-614 (1943).
13 United States v. Boyd, supra note 5; Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United
States, 47 F.2d 942 (N.D. Tex. 1931).
1 185 Kan. 274, 341 P.2d 1002 (1959).
2 "A judicial sale in such action or suit shall have the same effect respecting the
discharge of property from liens and encumbrances held by the United States as may
be provided with respect to such matters by local law of the place where the property
is situated, Where such a sale of real estate is made to satisfy a lien prior to that of the
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